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Abstract
In the Netherlands, the legal possibilities for post-custodial
supervision have been extended considerably in recent
years. A currently passed law aims to further increase these
possibilities specifically for dangerous (sex) offenders. This
law consists of three separate parts that may all result in life-
long supervision. In the first two parts, the supervision is
embedded in the conditional release after either a prison
sentence or the safety measure ‘ter beschikking stelling’
(TBS). This paper focuses on the third part of the law, which
introduces an independent supervisory safety measure as a
preventive continuation of both a prison sentence and the
TBS measure. Inevitably, this new independent sanction rai-
ses questions about legitimacy and necessity, on which this
paper reflects from a human rights perspective. Against the
background of the existing Dutch penal law system, the
content of the law is thoroughly assessed in view of the
legal framework of the Council of Europe and the legal prin-
ciples of proportionality and less restrictive means. In the
end, we conclude that the supervisory safety measure is not
legitimate nor necessary (yet). Apart from the current lack
of (empirical evidence of) necessity, we state that there is a
real possibility of an infringement of Article 5(4) ECHR and
Article 7 ECHR, a lack of legitimising supervision ‘gaps’ in
the existing penal law system, and finally a lack of clear
legal criteria. Regardless of the potential severity of violent
(sex) offenses, to simply justify this supervisory safety meas-
ure on the basis of ‘better safe than sorry’ is not enough.
Keywords: Dutch penal law, preventive supervision, danger-
ous offenders, human rights, social rehabilitation
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1 Introduction
Similar to many other Western jurisdictions,1 the ques-
tion how to control alleged dangerous offenders and to
prevent them from reoffending is an ongoing debate in
the Netherlands. This debate was once held primarily
along the lines of preventive detention and incapacita-
tion, particularly regarding mentally disordered offend-
ers2 and repeat offenders,3 while now the emphasis in
Dutch penal law is (also) on supervision, again a similar
trend as throughout Europe.4 As stated in the editorial
of this special issue, the supervision itself is usually
legally constituted either as an alternative to prosecution
or custodial sentencing, or as (different forms of) an
autonomous (community) sanction. In the Netherlands,
both forms of supervision exist, and sometimes a super-
vision modality actually occurs in both, e.g. the modality
of a ban to contact certain people (e.g. the victim) and
community service.5 Yet, as in many other civil law
jurisdictions, supervision within the Dutch system is
not primarily perceived as autonomous sentencing but
rather as ‘alternative’ sentencing, acting as the replace-
ment of a suspended prison sentence or as part of a con-
ditional release from imprisonment.6 The latter types of
alternative, community sentencing are not new to the
Dutch penal law system. Already in 1886, the legal pos-
sibility of conditional release after a prison sentence was
introduced, followed by the introduction of the inde-
pendent conditional sentence in 1915 and the introduc-
tion of the possibility of suspension of remand in 1926.
In practice, extensive use is made of all these supervi-
sion modalities.
Yet, as a result of many social and penological develop-
ments, supervision has been increasingly consolidated
and extended in Dutch penal law in the past decades.
Against the backdrop of both a culture of fear7 and a
trend of public security together with a strong believe
2. M.J.F. van der Wolf, TBS veroordeeld tot vooroordeel (2012).
3. S. Struijk, De ISD in perspectief (2011).
4. F. McNeill and K. Beyens, Offender Supervision in Europe (2013).
5. G. McIvor, K. Beyens, E. Blay & M. Boone, ‘Community Service in Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Scotland and Spain: A Comparative Perspective’,
2 European Journal of Probation 82 (2010).
6. M. Boone and M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Decision-Making and Offender
Supervision’, in F. McNeill and K. Beyens (eds.), Offender Supervision
in Europe (2013), 51.
7. F. Furedi, Culture of Fear Revisited (2006).
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that penal law is an effective, managerial means to
achieve this objective,8 not only existing supervision
modalities were expanded, but new modalities were cre-
ated as well. This emergence and consolidation of
supervision in Dutch penal law was also significantly
driven by several high-profile (legal cases against) (sex)
offenders. This is not so much the punishment for their
wrongdoing, but rather their post-custodial re-entry
into society caused for public concern and upheaval.
Notwithstanding the conditional nature of the (early)
release of alleged dangerous ex-offenders, citizens are
increasingly under protest concerning the presence of
such an ex-offender in their neighbourhood. As a conse-
quence of this ‘not in my backyard’ backlash, the Proba-
tion Services, as the implementing authority in regard to
the re-integration, have trouble in finding mayors who
are actually willing to let the re-integrating offenders
stay in their community.9 Not only did this result in
penal and civil lawsuits, e.g. regarding the disclosure of
the ex-offenders residence,10 but it has also further
intensified the debate on the re-integration, freedom of
movement and privacy of dangerous (sex) offenders, on
the one hand, and the social pressure under which the
local administration and the Probation Services have to
operate, on the other hand. This is a process in which
the Probation Services as such have changed in recent
years from an offender-support organisation into an
offender-control organisation,11 making structured deci-
sions on risk assessment.12 Meanwhile, the requisite bal-
ancing of interests between respecting (basic) rights of
the dangerous ex-(sex)offender and the interests of vic-
tims and society seems to be inclined towards the latter
interests. For example the Dutch legislator13 has
responded to the tricky question if, how, when and
where to re-integrate dangerous (sex) offenders after
their custodial sentence, by extending the penal law sys-
tem. Because the prevention of reoffending has become
very important, if not the main goal of the Dutch sanc-
tion system,14 this legal extension is mainly aimed at
8. R. van Swaaningen, ‘Public Safety and the Management of Fear’, 9
Theoretical Criminology 289 (2005).
9. M. Boone, H.G. van de Bunt & D. Siegel, Gevangene van het verleden
(2014), and the prior study H.G. van de Bunt, N.L. Holvast & J. Plaisier,
Toezicht op zedendelinquenten door de politie in samenwerking met
de reclassering (2011).
10. In this context, it is important to note that, unlike many other jurisdic-
tions in and outside Europe – see T. Thomas, ‘European Developments
in Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring’, 18 EJCCLCJ 403 (2010)
– the Netherlands has no mandatory sex offender notification nor regis-
tration policy. Although the call (from citizens and politicians) to imple-
ment such policy is getting stronger, it still does not seem to happen,
especially since recent research showed that in general the notification
and registration with regard to sex offenders do not have (positive)
effect on their recidivism (R.P. van der Horst, H.J.M. Schönberger &
C.H. de Kogel, Toezicht op zedendelinquenten. Effectiviteit en veron-
derstelde werkzame mechanismen van vormen van toezicht [2012]).
11. A. Menger and A.G. Donker, ‘Bronnen van professionele effectiviteit’,
38 Justitiële verkenningen 24 (2012).
12. J. Bosker, C. Witteman & J. Hermanns, ‘Structured Decisions about
Dutch Probation Service Interventions’, 60 Probation Journal 168
(2013).
13. In the Netherlands, the legislator is constituted by both the Government
(including the King) and Parliament.
14. Struijk (2011), above n. 3.
long-lasting, possibly even indeterminate forms of post-
custodial release supervision. It is precisely this ‘back
door sentencing form’15 that this special issue focuses
on. Therefore, the scope of this article is also limited to
post-custodial release supervision modalities.
The first and important recent legal change concerning
Dutch post-custodial supervision is the conversion of
the unconditional early release after two-thirds of the
prison sentence into a conditional release. Furthermore,
new (restrictive) conditions were created and enshrined
in law, and, finally, the unconditional release from the
institution for the admission of dangerous mental disor-
dered offenders with provision by the State (in Dutch
the TBS ‘met dwangverpleging’) was curbed. Since
2013, an unconditional termination of this TBS safety
measure is possible only if it is preceded by one year of
conditional termination. In addition to these reinforce-
ments of existing supervision modalities, a currently
passed law – 24 November 201516 – is focused on a
threefold increase in the post-custodial supervision of
dangerous (sex) offenders. First, by aiming to extend
the length of parole after a prison sentence. Second, by
aiming to extend the length of parole after the TBS
measure. Last, by aiming to introduce a new indepen-
dent supervisory safety measure as a preventive contin-
uation of both a prison sentence and the TBS measure.
All three parts of this law could result in life-long super-
vision. Given both the almost inherent severe restrictive
nature of the supervisory conditions and the limited val-
idity of assessment of dangerousness,17 the modality of
(possibly) life-long supervision raises questions not only
about the legal limits to it, but also about the transpar-
ency, fairness, and accountability of this type of sen-
tencing and the decisions taken.18
Focusing on the currently passed – but not implemen-
ted yet – law on post-custodial release supervision in the
Netherlands, this article will reflect on the aforemen-
tioned questions from a primarily human rights per-
spective. Before addressing this perspective in detail in
Section 5, first the main features of the Dutch penal law
system will be outlined, as well as its sentencing theory
(Section 2). Then, the content of the law – particularly
the third part – will be evaluated against the legal prin-
ciples of both proportionality (Section 3) and less intru-
sive means (Section 4), in each case against the back-
ground of the already existing post-custodial supervi-
sion modalities. Finally, in the concluding remarks
(Section 6), it is argued that the legal constraints are
such that the new independent supervisory safety meas-
ure is not legitimate (yet).
15. N. Padfield, R. Morgan & M. Maguire, ‘Out of Court, Out of Sight?’, in
M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Criminology (2012), 955.
16. Stb. 2015, 460.
17. See e.g. A. Ashworth and J. Roberts, ‘Sentencing: Theory, Principle, and
Practice’, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Criminology (2012), 866.
18. Padfield et al., above n. 15.
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2 Outlines of Both the Dutch
Penal Law System and the
Underlying Sentencing
Theory
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the concept of
(preventive) supervision is not new to the Dutch penal
law system and has even increased in recent years. This
fits the contemporary penal policy in the Netherlands,
driven by ‘increasing political and public concern about
the costs of imprisonment and of reoffending’.19 Indeed,
reducing reoffending has been strongly prioritised in
Dutch sentencing in recent years. Regarding this priori-
tised goal, the Dutch penal law system has an abundant
history of searching for such penal sentences so that
reoffending can be reduced, and preferably prevented
effectively.20 Particularly noticeable in this respect is the
two-sidedness of this penal quest. In contrast to many
jurisdictions, yet similar to, for example Germany,21 the
Netherlands has a bifurcated, two-track system of retro-
spective, retributive penalties, on the one hand, and
prospective, preventive measures, on the other hand.
The penalties and measures differ significantly, at least
in theory. In practice, though, the distinction is more
subtle. In recent decades, the objectives of custodial
penalties and safety measures have grown closer togeth-
er.22 This is partly because the current Dutch sentenc-
ing theory is a compromise between the traditional Neo-
Classical theory and the subsequent Modern theory.23
Furthermore, one of the main arguments justifying the
distinction between penalties and measures – in that a
measure, unlike a penalty, does not aim to cause the
offender to suffer – is rather unsatisfactory from both a
pragmatic and a moral point of view as the offender does
not actually feel whether the suffering is intentionally
inflicted upon him.24 Nevertheless, to be able to under-
stand the Dutch supervision modalities, it is important
to clarify the differences between penalties and meas-
ures. These differences are generally described as fol-
lows.
19. F. McNeill, ‘Community Sanctions and European Penology’, in T.
Daems, S. Snacken & D. van Zyl Smit (eds.), European Penology (2013),
171, at 172.
20. Struijk (2011), above n. 3; S. Struijk, ‘Punishing Repeat Offenders in the
Netherlands: Balancing between Incapacitation and Treatment’, 33
Behavioral Sciences & the Law 148 (2015) and M.J.F. van der Wolf and
M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Mandatory Measures: Safety Measures?’, in M. Her-
zog-Evans (ed.), Offender Release and Supervision: The Role of Courts
and the Use of Discretion (2014), 193.
21. K. Drenkhahn, ‘Secure Preventive Detention in Germany’, 31 Behavio-
ral Sciences & the Law 312 (2013) and B.-D. Meier, Strafrechtliche
Sanktionen (2015).
22. Van der Wolf and Herzog-Evans, above n. 20.
23. C. Kelk and Ch. Haffmans, ‘De strafrechtelijke maatregelen en het
tanende tweesporenstelsel’, in J.P. Balkema et al (eds.), Gedenkboek
honderd jaar Wetboek van Strafrecht (1986), 333.
24. J.W. de Keijser, ‘Never Mind the Pain, It’s a Measure! Justifying Meas-
ures as Part of the Dutch Bifurcated System of Sanctions’, in M. Tonry
(ed.), Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? (2011), 188.
The penalty is intended to retaliate against the offence
that the offender committed in the past, stemming
directly from fundamental notions of guilt, criminal
responsibility and just deserts, which underlie the
Dutch Neo-classical theory of punishment.25 Conse-
quently, the penalty is not only strictly bound with pro-
portionality limits, i.e. it may not be more intrusive than
the offence itself or the extent of the offenders’ guilt,
but also bound with determined duration at the moment
of sentencing. Dutch examples of a penalty are the pris-
on sentence and the community service, both always
with a fixed legal maximum duration at the moment of
sentencing, although this may include (providing that
the law allows it for certain crimes) the possibility of a
conviction to lifetime imprisonment.
In contrast, the (safety) measure, imposed either in
addition to a penalty or instead of it, is intended to safe-
guard society from future harm such as recidivism or
dangerousness.26 Consequently, the measure is not
strictly bound with proportionality limits, at least not
related to the seriousness of the offence, and may take as
long as necessary to reduce the offenders’ risk and
thereby effectively protecting society.27 This conceptu-
alisation of the safety measure stems directly from the
‘Modern’ criminal law theory, also known as the ‘social
defence’ movement, which was particularly influential
in the beginning of the nineteenth century.28 Whereas
the view of the Neo-Classical theory was mostly limited
to both the offence and an appropriate retaliation for it,
the Modern theory explicitly expanded that view to the
offender. Prompted by the rise in (behavioural) scientif-
ic knowledge about the causes of crime, modern theo-
rists explicitly beheld how the system could counteract
these causes as effectively as possible in order to prevent
crime. Moreover, individual-based deterrence became
the central aim of Dutch penal sentencing, seeking to
effectively protect society and prevent reoffending in
the future.29 Consequently, this called for a significant
change of the Dutch Penal Code, which in accordance
with the Neo-Classical theory was originally rather sim-
ple and uniform with a leading role for the penalty.
Deciding to overstep the inherent boundaries of the
penalty, and thereby ‘ignoring’ or ‘overruling’ the pre-
determined, proportionate sentencing as one of the
major protecting principles of the Neo-Classical Theo-
ry, various safety measures were introduced in both the
previous and the current century.30 Some of these meas-
ures are asset-related, e.g. the measure to confiscate ille-
gally obtained benefits, or property-related, e.g. the
measure to extract (dangerous) objects an offender used
committing his offence or that were found during crimi-
25. Ibid. and Struijk (2011), above n. 3.
26. See e.g. T. Kooijmans, Op maat geregeld? (2002) and Van der Wolf
and Herzog-Evans, above n. 20.
27. According to Dutch penal law, though, penalties and measures can to a
high extent be imposed simultaneously.
28. M.S. Groenhuijsen and D. van der Landen (eds.), De moderne richting
in het strafrecht (1990).
29. Struijk (2011), above n. 3.
30. Van der Wolf and Herzog-Evans, above n. 20.
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nal investigations. Other safety measures, and more rel-
evant to this study, are offender-related. And exactly as
in many other Western world jurisdictions,31 Dutch
safety measures are most frequently applied to a variety
of alleged dangerous offenders.
In Dutch penal law, there are two examples of custodial
safety measures dating back to the era in which the
Modern theory was prevailing. First, the custodial safe-
ty measure for habitual offenders, adopted in 1929.32
Based on both objective and subjective legal criteria, a
judge could decide whether alleged dangerous habitual
offenders can be kept in preventive detention for a mini-
mum of five and a maximum of ten years after execution
of the initially imposed prison sentence. The detention
as such was aimed at the incapacitation of the habitual
offender or, if susceptible, at improvement of his behav-
iour. The central notion of dangerousness was defined
as ‘he who unceasingly and even professionally reof-
fends’. The legal criteria hardly further demarcated this
notion, as well as the specific offender target group for
imposing this safety measure, because these criteria
required only past reoffending and ‘a necessary and jus-
tified’ preventive detention to prevent future reoffend-
ing. For these, and other fundamental reasons, the cus-
todial safety measure for habitual offenders had, despite
the adoption by Parliament, never formally taken effect
and, consequently, the statutory regulation was with-
drawn in 1988.
The second and most renowned Dutch example of such
a safety measure dating back to the Modern theory is
the aforementioned TBS measure for mental disordered
and (thus) dangerous offenders. The main reason for
introducing this custodial TBS measure in 1928 was
because neither the prison sentence nor the general psy-
chiatry was able to adequately respond to this offender
category.33 Although the TBS measure is designed as a
custodial sanction, the actual execution takes place in
specific treatment institutions aiming at one’s rehabilita-
tion. With the twofold justification of both public pro-
tection and treatment of the mental disordered offender,
the still existing TBS measure is potentially and only for
rather serious and violent crimes of indeterminate dura-
tion. In these cases, the measure can be prolonged indef-
initely as long as, in the opinion of the judge, depriva-
tion of liberty is still necessary because the offender’s
treatment has not (yet) diminished the danger he poses
to society. Consequently, the TBS measure is the ulti-
mate form of preventive detention in the Dutch penal
law system. Of course, the life-long imprisonment is an
ultimate sentence as well, yet not preventive by nature.
Because of the divergent goals of the TBS measure and
the life-long imprisonment – the first is aimed at reha-
bilitation, the latter is inherently not – the Dutch
Supreme Court (‘Hoge Raad’) has ruled that both sanc-
tions may not be imposed simultaneously.34
31. J. Pratt, Punishment and Civilisation (2002).
32. See extensively Struijk (2011), above n. 3 and Struijk (2015), above
n. 20.
33. Van der Wolf, above n. 2.
34. Dutch Supreme Court 14 March 2006, NJ 2007, 345.
The TBS measure has remained an accepted measure
up until today because of continuing adjustments to the
system.35 One of the most significant adjustments is that
the previous medical model was replaced by a legal
model,36 leading to the introduction of various legal
constraints in 1988. Furthermore, it led to the introduc-
tion of the conditional, supervisory TBS measure in
1997. Within the framework of this alternative to the
custodial variant, the court imposes several conditions –
behavioural and/or restrictive – to which the convicted
offender must adhere. The Probation Services are
responsible for monitoring the compliance. Violating
the conditions may lead to custodial TBS. In order to
reduce the number of imposed custodial TBS measures,
this supervisory alternative has been strengthened in
recent years, most importantly by raising the maximum
duration from four to nine years. An opposite adjust-
ment to the TBS sentencing scheme is that the custodial
TBS measure in recent years may even be justified by
solely the aim of public protection, subordinating the
aim of treatment. Cost-effectiveness deliberations even
led to the introduction of a so-called ‘longstay-ward’ as
an official differentiation within the TBS domain in
1998.37 When a TBS detainee is placed on such a ward,
the focus is no longer on treatment, or rather the treat-
ment is no longer aimed at rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation has always been a recognised objective in
Dutch penal law. Already in the past, the Dutch
Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to this
objective, stating that the rehabilitation duty for the
Government is not limited to the period after detention,
nor exclusively aimed at a possible return to the Dutch
society.38 Yet, over the past decades, the legal interpre-
tation of rehabilitation has been subject to change. This
is mainly because – although this objective is regulated
by article 2 of both the Dutch Acts concerning the exe-
cution of imprisonment and the TBS order – it is not a
constitutional right, in contrast to some other Western
jurisdictions such as Germany.39 Moreover, the defini-
tion of rehabilitation in the Dutch Prisons Act is cer-
tainly not conclusive but leaves ample room for inter-
pretation because for a long time the definition is as fol-
lows: ‘the execution of the custodial sentence is made
subservient to the offenders’ rehabilitation as much as
possible’.
Arising from the fact that rehabilitation is thus not an
absolute right in Dutch penal law, the actual meaning
and the content of this penal principle are to a large
extent dependent on the prevailing sentencing theory
and penal policy. In recent times, under the influence of
the dominant theoretical concepts of risk society and
utilitarian instrumentalism, rehabilitation is primarily
35. Van der Wolf and Herzog-Evans, above n. 20.
36. Kelk and Haffmans, above n. 23.
37. H.J.C. van Marle and M.J.F. van der Wolf, ‘Safety Measures in the
Netherlands. The TBS’, in M. Herzog-Evans (ed.), Transnational Crimi-
nology Manual (2010) 439.
38. Dutch Supreme Court 16 January 1987, NJ 1987, 405.
39. D. van Zyl Smit and S. Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and
Policy (2009) and Padfield et al., above n. 15.
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defined as risk-based. One could even argue that, in the
Netherlands, rehabilitation is now more narrowly con-
ceptualised as reducing reoffending,40 which calls for a
strict control system and results in an authoritarian
rather than an anthropocentric system.41
The most recent change in the legal definition of reha-
bilitation was the addition of two text parts in 2015. The
first added phrase was that in the process of granting
freedoms to detainees, such as granting a leave, one
needs to take into account the safety of society and the
interests of victims and survivors. This was undoubted-
ly triggered by some high-profile (sex) offenders, who
escaped and reoffended during their leave. Second, the
phrase was added that the execution of the custodial
sentence is made subservient to the offenders’ rehabili-
tation, depending on his behaviour during detention.
This second change in the legal definition of rehabilita-
tion is to a large extent attributable to the global ‘What
Works’ movement, which has been firmly embraced in
the Netherlands since the turn of the century.42 The
movement has not only led to a growing interest in, and
subsequent development of, various programmes for
behavioural change, both within prison and as part of
community sentences, but it has also made the detainee
himself responsible for the actual extent to which is
invested in his rehabilitation. On the basis of his proven
willingness and efforts to participate in reducing reof-
fending and rehabilitation interventions, as well as the
outcomes of risk assessment tools, his conditional
release can be determined. More broadly, this principle
of the offenders’ individual responsibility also underlies
the current detention regime in the Netherlands. Every
inmate will start his detention in a basic programme, but
(only) by exhibiting good behaviour he may be promo-
ted to a plus programme with more freedoms and possi-
bilities.43 Thus, in the current penal trend in the Neth-
erlands, rehabilitation-oriented sanctions seem to be
reserved for only the ‘privileged’ offenders who are
expected to (and are able to) achieve success in this
respect.44
This penal trend holds certainly true for yet another
custodial safety measure, the so-called ISD measure for
repeat offenders (‘inrichting voor stelselmatige
daders’).45 Although the ISD measure may also be
imposed in a supervisory variant, ultimately it is a custo-
dial safety measure aiming to prevent future reoffending
and harm. The main underlying concept of dangerous-
ness differs significantly from the TBS measure. The
ISD measure is specifically aimed at repeat offenders,
who are not necessarily mentally ill – which by itself is
40. McIvor et al., above n. 5.
41. McNeill, above n. 19.
42. A.A. van den Hurk and P.Ph. Nelissen, ‘“What Works”: een nieuwe
benadering van resocialisatie van delinquenten’, 5 Sancties 280 (2004).
43. Freedoms and possibilities, to some extent, can be seen as ‘normal’ con-
ditions for an acceptable detention regime, e.g. increased opportunities
for both education and receiving visitors, and the ability to be transfer-
red to a limited secured regime.
44. Struijk (2011), above n. 3 and M.M. Boone, Our Own Rascals First
(2012).
45. Struijk (2011), above n. 3 and Struijk (2015), above n. 20.
not a legal criterion for imposing the ISD measure –
although in practice almost every repeat offender suffers
from a mental disorder, or even a co-occurring
disorder.46 The repeat offenders are rather perceived as
dangerous because they continuously exhibit criminal
behaviour,47 resulting moreover in (often addiction
driven) ‘highly visible’, but rather ‘light’ urban crimes.
The danger they pose to society is thus strongly nui-
sance related, which is something completely different
from the danger the TBS offenders usually pose and the
severe crimes they usually commit.48 Therefore, in con-
trast to the TBS measure, the ISD measure is legally of
determinate duration with a maximum of two years. In
contrast to the legislator’s intentions, both judges and
penitentiary workers appear to strive for as much treat-
ment (of the individuals’ behavioural problems and/or
addiction and/or mental disorder) as possible. Conse-
quently, the ISD measure constantly balances between
incapacitation and treatment.49
Both the implemented safety measures TBS and ISD
focus on a more or less specific offender category and
are (partly) custodial by nature, depriving the offender
of his or her liberty. That does not apply for the recent-
ly introduced (2012) community-based supervisory
safety measure. It is an independent restraint sentence
for a maximum of two years, by which the court can
impose restrictive conditions on the offender such as a
ban on contacting certain people, a ban on doing certain
voluntary work, a duty to report to the Probation Serv-
ices, a duty to undergo clinical treatment or, finally, a
duty to move. The measure may be imposed for any
committed offence, and its underlying dangerousness
concept is defined in broad terms as restoring the public
order and preventing harmful behaviour towards civil-
ians, victims or witnesses. Moreover, violation of the
conditions ordered by the court results in detention
(equally ordered by the court) up to six months, which
does not lift the validity of these conditions. In practice,
this supervisory safety measure appears to be particular-
ly imposed on offenders who have been sentenced to a
prison sentence of less than a year, and who therefore
legally do not apply for conditional release.50
Altogether, arising from the notion that reoffending
should be prevented, especially from dangerous offend-
ers, various safety measures have been adopted in Dutch
penal law. The offender-related safety measures are
either custodial by nature, or involve non-custodial sen-
tencing in the community. The sanction system was
46. N. Tollenaar and A.M. van der Laan, Monitor veelplegers 2013, WODC
(2013).
47. One of the legal criteria for imposing the ISD measure is prior recidivism
of at least three convictions in the last five years. It is because of this
total number of three that the ISD measure has been referred to as ‘a
watered-down version of the American “three strikes” practice’: Van
Swaaningen, above n. 8.
48. Van der Wolf, above n. 2.
49. Struijk (2015), above n. 20.
50. S. Meijer, ‘De gedragsbeïnvloedende en vrijheidsbeperkende toezichts-
maatregel als instrument in de strijd voor de maatschappelijke
(schijn)veiligheid’, in M.S Groenhuijsen et al (eds.), Roosachtig
strafrecht (2013), 385.
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recently once again expanded (and even completed, one
might say) with both the introduction of various legal
possibilities to execute the imposed sanction pending
appeal and the possibilities to immediately arrest
offenders who violate their conditions. To this extent
the even more recently enacted law to expand post-cus-
todial supervision fits well in the development of the
Dutch sentencing scheme. In the following section, we
will further discuss the content and legal framework of
this latter law, with special reference to the independent
supervisory safety measure.
3 Legal Frameworks for
Indeterminate Supervision:
Evaluation of Proportionality
The fact that community sentences must also be pro-
portionate to the seriousness of the offence for which
the sentence is imposed51 stems from the realisation
that, despite their character of merely freedom restrict-
ing, these supervisory sentences quite often have a puni-
tive content. In this respect, Van Zyl Smit and Snacken
commented that ‘all attempts to limit the rights of
released persons beyond their sentence should be
approached with considerable caution because they
could amount to additional punishment’.52 This realisa-
tion, and development, is to be welcomed as supervision
imposed with restrictive conditions such as an extended
reporting requirement, or participation in a treatment
programme, or an obligation to move, may indeed result
in a harsher punishment than short prison sentences.
Yet, it is certainly not easy to determine whether a
supervisory sentence is in fact disproportionate. The
international human rights framework within which this
must generally be determined will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5. In the present section, though, the legal frame-
work of the presently discussed Dutch law is discussed,
in order to determine whether or not it set limits to the
extended supervision, and whether the three parts of the
law are proportionate to the extent of the problem they
should resolve. In this respect, attention is also paid to
the pre-legislative justification of the draft law and its
possible future practice.
As mentioned, the possibility of early release has already
existed for a long time in Dutch penal law. The current
legal framework constitutes a conditional release, as it
has always been since 1886, except for an intervening
period of twenty years when it was a standard release.
The current conditional release is after two-thirds of the
prison sentence, provided that it is an unconditional
sentence of at least one year. The probationary period of
the release may not last longer than the remaining one-
third of the sentence, albeit with a minimum duration of
51. D. van Zyl Smit and A. Ashworth, ‘Disproportionate Sentences as
Human Rights Violations’, 67 The Modern Law Review 541 (2004).
52. Van Zyl Smit and Snacken, above n. 39.
one year for the probation of the general condition. By
virtue of the general, standard prevailing condition, the
convict should refrain from reoffending. In contrast, the
more specific conditions, relating to the offender and his
individual behaviour, do not have such a minimum
term. By means of the first part of the currently enacted
law, the Dutch legislator wants to change that. Although
that may be understandable for reasons of consistency of
legislation, the imposition of the general condition for
one year is clearly much less invasive than the yearlong
imposition of a specific condition aimed for behavioural
change or restraint.53 However, this has not stopped
Parliament from adopting an amendment that gives the
court the possibility to extend the probationary period
even continuously for up to two years. Consequently,
any offender who has been sentenced by the court to an
unconditional imprisonment of at least one year may
therefore, in principle, be life-long supervised. Not only
does he have to adhere to the imposed conditions for an
indeterminate time, but he also has to fear for the execu-
tion of the remaining part of the prison sentence when-
ever he fails to adhere, although execution does require
a separate court order.
The second part of the law specifically concerns the
safety measure TBS for dangerous mentally disordered
offenders. As stated earlier, this safety measure can be
imposed both conditionally, maintaining the offender in
the community, and unconditionally, detaining the
offender in a secured treatment facility. In the uncondi-
tional custodial variety, the legislation allows the possi-
bility of a conditional termination for reasons of a pro-
gressive and supervised re-integration. The probation-
ary period of this conditional termination is set at a
maximum of nine years. Until 2008, this period was
three years. When the law was changed and the duration
was set at nine years, the possibility of an indefinite pro-
bationary duration was discussed.54 However, the legis-
lator deliberately chose not to introduce such an indefi-
nite supervision modality, based on research showing
that after nine years the chances of reconviction signifi-
cantly decreases in relation to the preceding period.55 It
is therefore all the more remarkable that the Govern-
ment by means of the enacted bill introduces such an
indefinite duration anyway. The general justification is
that, for certain crimes, a possibly indefinite probation-
ary period of the conditionally terminated TBS measure
is a harsh, yet necessary and proportionate means to
guarantee both the fundaments of the TBS scheme and
its termination. More specifically, the legislator justifies
this new post-custodial supervision modality by high-
lighting new research showing that the percentage of
repeat offenders with a very serious offence among sex
offenders still increases for a long time after discharge
53. M.J.F. van der Wolf and S. Struijk, ‘(Levens)lang toezicht als zelfstan-
dige maatregel: wordt nu echt de Rubicon overgestoken?’, 6 Sancties
368 (2014).
54. Ibid.
55. E. Leuw, Recidive na de tbs, WODC (1999) and B.S.J. Wartna, S. el
Harbachi & L.M. van der Knaap, Buiten behandeling, WODC-Recidi-
vestudies (2005).
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from the custodial TBS facility, and that adequate forms
of supervision and guidance may be useful for the pur-
pose of reducing the risk of recidivism longer than nine
years after discharge.56
Yet, this justification has much to criticise.57 For exam-
ple the ‘new’ research findings relate to the long-term
recidivism of TBS detainees who were released in the
1970s and 1980s of the past century. Thus, it is highly
questionable to what extent this has relevance for the
future outflows and recidivism of TBS detainees. Fur-
thermore, the latest legislative change in 2008 has not
been evaluated, making it as yet unknown in how many
cases the current maximum supervision period of nine
years is actually fully exploited. Let alone that it can
serve as a justification for introducing an even longer
and possibly life-long supervision period. On the other
hand, there are legal constraints, particularly the fact
that it is up to a court to periodically review whether a
renewal of the conditional termination is appropriate or
not. Nevertheless, one may ask for a more solid justifi-
cation in order to add such a modality of long, possibly
life-long supervision to the TBS scheme, especially
because this form of extended supervision is expected to
occur only in exceptional cases. Considering the fact
that in practice there seems to be little need for addi-
tional supervision after a probationary period of nine
years, both legal scholars and legislative advisory bodies
have labelled the proposal as unnecessary and prema-
ture.
To an even greater extent this holds true for the third
proposal of the draft law. As briefly mentioned earlier,
this proposal involves the introduction of an indepen-
dent supervisory safety measure. This measure may also
imply (life-)long supervision after the (un)conditional
termination of the TBS measure, albeit not as contin-
gent modality within the TBS scheme itself, but as an
independent sanction. According to the intended legal
framework, the procedure of this sentencing scheme is
rather unique for Dutch penal law as the judicial deci-
sions on imposition and execution are separated, both in
time and authority. In this twofold procedure, the impo-
sition of the new measure requires a concurrent imposi-
tion of a (un)conditional TBS measure or a (partly con-
ditional) prison sentence of a maximum of four years or
more. The latter possibility applies only for crimes
against the inviolability of the body, thus particularly for
(sexually) violent offenders. Indeed, this proposal seems
to be focused primarily on sex offenders, aiming for
public protection through their behavioural change and
restraint. Public protection is also the general basis for
the imposition of the measure, together with the afore-
mentioned condition of a concurrent imposed sentence.
Following the first stage of the imposition, the second
stage of the twofold procedure is (of course) the execu-
tion. However, the supervisory safety measure is not
56. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 816, n. 3, page 7 and Kamerstukken II
2013/14, 33 816, n. 6, page 28.
57. As stated before by legal scholars such as S. Struijk, ‘En nog meer en
langduriger toezicht: de overheid als Rupsje Nooitgenoeg’, 3 Sancties
137 (2014) and Van der Wolf and Struijk, above n. 53.
executed immediately after the verdict. On the contrary,
the execution will only start once the imposed TBS
measure or prison sentence is (un)conditionally termina-
ted. As this may take a while, usually for many years,
the Dutch Government has wisely decided to make the
execution a non-standard procedure. It requires anoth-
er, separate judicial decision from the court, at the
request of the Public Prosecutor, (soon) before the TBS
measure or the prison sentence will end. It is then up to
the court to decide whether the current situation is such
that the previously imposed measure must actually be
enforced. The legal requirements for execution are dif-
ferent, and more onerous than the requirements for
imposition. The court may decide to execute the meas-
ure if there is a risk of recidivism relating to such an
offence that would legitimise the imposition of this
measure, or if enforcement is needed to avoid seriously
damaging behaviour towards victims or witnesses. Both
requirements are rather subjective by nature and call for
a risk assessment. Remarkably, no multidisciplinary
advice is needed, merely an advice from the Probation
Services showing, inter alia, the results of the risk
assessment. The use of such a risk assessment is not new
to the Dutch sentencing scheme, as it already applies to
other (existing) safety measures, such as the aforemen-
tioned ISD measure for repeat offenders.58 However, in
addition to the fact that the (predictive) validity of those
risk instruments is still highly criticised,59 this criticism
may apply even stronger to the new supervisory meas-
ure because of its possibly indefinite duration, and the
fact that the actual decision to execute the measure is
legally immediately enforceable. However, a separate
appeal may be lodged against this second decision.
Only in this second phase of the procedure – the execu-
tion – does the court further specify both the duration
and the content of the measure. As to the duration of
the measure, the court may order the enforcement of the
measure for a period of two, three, four or five years.
Upon expiry and based on the aforementioned execu-
tion requirements, the duration may be extended
unlimited by the court for another two, three, four or
five years. Thus, the supervisory safety measure may
last indefinitely. On the other hand, the legal framework
guarantees in any case that a judge periodically assesses
whether an extension is appropriate. As to the content
of the measure, the court may impose fourteen condi-
tions, whether or not combined. Those conditions are
explicitly mentioned in the legislation. In addition, the
court may also ordain electronic monitoring. For the
most part the fourteen conditions are restrictive, such as
a notification requirement and a ban to have contact
with certain persons. Others are therapeutic, such as a
duty to participate in treatment. The court can order
this condition with or without a clinical admission. In
the first case, the admission lacks the consent of the
offender; he or she is not so much restricted in his or
58. Struijk (2011), above n. 3 and Struijk (2015), above n. 20.
59. M. Moerings, ‘Persistent Offenders’, in M. Boone and M. Moerings
(eds.), Dutch Prisons (2007), 187.
101
Sanne Struijk & Paul Mevis doi: 10.5553/ELR.000063 - ELR December 2016 | No. 2
This article from Erasmus Law Review is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 500266
her freedoms but rather deprived of his or her liberty. A
second reason why the supervisory safety measure may
turn into deprivation of liberty is the fact that alterna-
tive detention with a maximum duration of six months
per (extended) term will occur whenever a condition is
breached. It is because of these legal possibilities of dep-
rivation of liberty that in our view this measure must
comply with the test required by Article 5 ECHR. Both
this test and the question whether the measure actually
does comply will be addressed in detail in Section 5.
The aforementioned conditions are as such not new to
the Dutch penal law system. Already in the framework
of many supervision modalities, it is possible to set these
conditions.60 The draft law does introduce three new
conditions, though. A ban to do certain voluntary work,
a ban to live in certain areas and the opposite duty to
move. These conditions are clearly very restrictive by
nature, as well as clearly driven by the (housing) prob-
lems of re-integrating sex offenders. The same is reflec-
ted in the pre-legislative justification, in which the
Dutch Government explicitly refers to the added value
of the measure.61 According to the Government, this
added value is especially true for crimes such as possess-
ing child pornography. As this is not considered to be a
serious offence, it may ‘only’ legitimise a custodial TBS
order for a maximised period of four years. Therefore,
according to the legislator, additional supervision would
be required by means of the proposed supervisory safety
measure.
However, in light of the proportionality test, one may
actually question the added value. The foremost con-
cern is the fact that in practice there seems to be limited
need for this measure. An impact analysis showed an
expected annual execution of the proposed measure
regarding thirteen to thirty-three sex offenders and
fourteen to twenty-nine violent offenders.62 Out of a
total Dutch population of nearly seventeen million
inhabitants, this is quite a small number. Together with
the expected success rate of 5% to 30%, and the expec-
ted pragmatic and financial bottlenecks in the enforce-
ment of this possibly life-long supervision, the question
arises as to whether the measure is proportionate to the
extent of the problem. This is especially true when one
takes into account the fact that the public upheaval
resulting from the sex offenders’ re-integration occurs
only in a small minority of cases and generally disap-
pears quickly.63 Therefore, the above-mentioned ques-
tion and legal issue will most likely lead to reluctance
among the judiciary, perhaps not so much with respect
to the imposition of the measure, but rather with regard
to the subsequent decision whether the measure must be
executed. As with most other forms of risk-based sen-
tencing, the judiciary bears great responsibility to bal-
ance the various interests in a just manner. As Henham
stated eloquently, ‘the risk management issue must be
60. F.W. Bleichrodt, P.A.M. Mevis & B. Volker, Vergroting van de slagvaar-
digheid van het strafrecht; een rechtsvergelijkend perspectief (2012).
61. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 816, n. 3.
62. Ibid.
63. Boone et al., above n. 9.
resolved by the judiciary who remain the unenviable
arbiters of predicted dangerousness’.64 With regard to
the Dutch safety measure for repeat offenders – the
aforementioned ISD measure – judges appear to be
quite capable to weigh the interests well and to sentence
in such a way that it is proportionate to both the extent
of the problem and the future risk the offender poses.65
Nevertheless, the level of dangerousness of repeat
offenders differs significantly from sex offenders and
violent offenders, for example because of the different
degrees of the offences committed by these offenders:
petty crime versus sex offences and violent offences.
But no matter how far-reaching the consequences of the
latter crimes are, this does not say anything about the
prediction whether a convicted sex offender or violent
offender will truly reoffend in future. And that predic-
tion is beset with various obstacles, including a lack of
precision and predictive value.66 In that respect, it can
be strongly criticised that the legal framework on the
new supervisory safety measure does not require a mul-
tidisciplinary advice to the court in order for them to
impose or execute the safety measure. Only an advice of
the Probation Services, stating the outcomes of the risk
assessment, is required or, if the court sets a condition
that involves treatment or inclusion in a forensic care
facility, a medical certificate. This meagre requirement
pinches even more so when one considers the two afore-
mentioned, rather subjective requirements for executing
the supervisory safety measure. Especially the required
necessity to avoid seriously damaging behaviour towards
victims or witnesses will be difficult to scientifically
support. As long as this continues, it contributes to our
previously stated view that the enacted law is prema-
ture.
Another argument for that opinion is the fact that,
according to the Dutch sentencing theory, a safety
measure is proportionate only if it is not merely imposed
in the public interest, but also to serve, at least to a cer-
tain extent, the individual interest.67 Yet, the latter
interest is clearly missing in the law presently discussed.
Naturally, the aim that the (sex) offender can carefully
and gradually return to society may also be of his indi-
vidual interest, as explicitly indicated in the pre-legisla-
tive justification, but that strongly depends on the con-
tent of the supervision. Will the supervision be truly
focused on the completion of the offenders’ rehabilita-
tion and behavioural change, or predominantly the con-
trol of the offender? On that imperative question, the
legislator has not said anything yet. Given the fact that
this safety measure may also be imposed on offenders
who are not mentally disturbed – those who have not
been sentenced to the TBS measure, but instead to a
64. R. Henham, ‘The Policy and Practice of Protective Sentencing’, 3 Crimi-
nology and Criminal Justice 57 (2003).
65. Struijk (2011), above n. 3 and Struijk (2015), above n. 20.
66. N. Morris and M. Miller, ‘Predictions of Dangerousness’, 6 Crime and
Justice 1 (1985) and L.M.J. Simon, ‘An Examination of the Assumptions
of Specialization, Mental Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offend-
ers’, 18 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 275 (2000).
67. W.P.J. Pompe, Beveiligingsmaatregelen naast straffen (1921).
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prison sentence – one may fear that the focus will be on
control. Research concerning supervision shows, how-
ever, that control is effective only when combined with
counselling, treatment, social support and a focus on
‘the realisation of meaningful lives’ instead of ‘the pre-
vention of risks’.68 An important side note, though, is
that it is still unknown how effective supervision will be
if it takes many years, let alone life-long.69 The lack of
prospect as a result of the indefinite duration of the pro-
posed supervisory safety measure may very well dimin-
ish these effects.70 If so, the new measure is not likely to
contribute to public safety. Given the equally existing
fear of a self-fulfilling prophecy and the possibility that
this supervisory measure may isolate the convicted (sex)
offender, which leads to dangerous situations,71 the
measure may easily have a counterproductive effect.
The necessity of this measure is therefore anything but
clear.
4 Legal Gaps? An Evaluation
of Alternative, Less
Restrictive Means
In order to protect society, a further step in the supervi-
sion of (conditionally) released inmates may very well be
legitimate, even if it results in an (even more severe)
human rights restriction, provided, though, that other
less restrictive means (LRM) for supervision are
(proved to be) insufficient. If this element is not
addressed properly, community sanctions tend to be
infected by what is known as the problem of ‘Net Wid-
ening’: new sanctions, introduced as an alternative,
causing a wider and stronger net of social control.72 In
the pre-legislative justification of the draft law, the leg-
islator proclaims that the proposed supervisory safety
measure complies with this LRM test.73 In fact, the cri-
tique with regard to – the supposed failure of – the cur-
rent penal sanctions concerning the offender category of
dangerous sex and/or violent offenders is one of the
main arguments of the legislator to underline the neces-
sity of the new supervisory measure. According to the
legislator, the most pressing supervision ‘gaps’ are
threefold.74
68. See e.g. A. McAlinden, ‘The Use of “Shame” in the Reintegration of
Sex Offenders’, 45 British Journal of Criminology 373 (2005); Van der
Horst et al., above n. 10 and B. Weaver, ‘Control or Change? Develop-
ing Dialogues between Desistance Research and Public Protection Prac-
tices’, 61 Probation Journal 8 (2014).
69. Van der Horst et al., above n. 10.
70. Van der Wolf and Struijk, above n. 53.
71. Nationaal Rapporteur Mensenhandel en Seksueel Geweld tegen Kinder-
en, Isoleren zedendelinquenten is niet de juiste weg (2013).
72. E. Reznichenko, ‘Cost-Effective Criminal Enforcement: A Law and Eco-
nomics Approach’ (Doctoral dissertation on file at the EUR, Rotterdam)
(2015).
73. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 816, n. 3.
74. Ibid.
First, the problem of mentally disturbed suspects of
whom the Public Prosecutor demands a custodial TBS
order but who refuses to cooperate with the required
multidisciplinary assessment, causing the judiciary to
struggle with the dilemma whether they can still impose
a TBS order or not.75 Although the Dutch Supreme
Court has ruled that, in such circumstances, a court may
indeed impose a TBS order, provided that the disorder
can be sufficiently established otherwise,76 in practice
this infamous trend among mentally disturbed suspects
has already resulted, and even still results, in a strong
decrease in the numbers of imposed TBS orders.77
Because many of these suspects are sentenced with a
prison sentence instead, the duration of their post-
release supervision is usually not very long. In an
attempt to tackle this troubling problem, the legislator
has made the new supervisory measure possible not only
for offenders who have been sentenced with a TBS
order but also for violent offenders who have been sen-
tenced for an offence punishable (with some exceptions)
with a prison sentence of four years or more.
The second supervision ‘gap’ that the legislator aims to
fill by introducing this supervisory measure is the maxi-
mised length of the conditional TBS order. Under
existing law, this conditional order may last for no lon-
ger than nine years. The third supervision ‘gap’ relates
to another TBS variant, the maximised custodial TBS
order. In contrast with the indeterminate custodial TBS
order, this maximised variant may last no longer than
four years and may only be imposed for non-violent
offences. The law rules that if the court decides to pro-
long the custodial TBS order, exceeding the four-year
term, the relevant violent offence must be explicitly jus-
tified in the judgement. Based on the prevailing doc-
trine of the Court of Arnhem-Leeuwarden – the highest
court in the Netherlands in cases concerning the prolon-
gation of TBS orders – the extension judge had a wide
discretion with regard to the assessment of the maximi-
sation of the TBS order.78 In other words, this judge
could independently assess whether there was a violent
crime, resulting in a maximised duration of the TBS
measure. The extension judge was even allowed to devi-
ate his judgement from the initial sentence whereby the
TBS measure was imposed. However, in 2012, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) disap-
proved of this doctrine.79 The Strasbourg Court ruled
that whenever the TBS order was imposed, the judge-
ment must justify whether the offender has committed a
violent crime. In the absence of such a justification, the
extension judge may not assess independently if the
TBS order was imposed for a violent crime and conse-
quently if this order is maximised or indeterminate.
75. M.J.F. van der Wolf, E.M. Gremmen, H.J.C. van Marle & P.A.M. Mevis,
‘Worstelen met de weigerende observandus’, 74 Delikt en Delinkwent
775 (2012).
76. Dutch Supreme Court 22 May 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW6184.
77. DJI, Forensische Zorg in getal 2010-2014 (2015).
78. Court of Appeal Arnhem 30 May 2011, LJN BQ6616.
79. ECtHR, Van der Velden v. the Netherlands, Applic. No. 21203/10, 31
July 2012.
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According to the ECtHR that would not only be in con-
flict with Dutch legislation but also with the legal cer-
tainty as required by Article 5(1) ECHR.
At first glance, the three arguments made by the legisla-
tor seem to be valid. However, to our opinion,80 there is
much to object. Each of these arguments directly relates
to the TBS sentencing scheme, stating that it is ineffec-
tive in order to protect society from dangerous released
offenders. Yet, instead of a thorough reform of the
existing scheme of this safety measure – if needed at
all – the legislator decided to introduce a new safety
measure. Why such a radical change in the sentencing
scheme whereas a less stringent solution may be on
hand? Or, to quote Brems and Lavrysen, why to use a
sledgehammer to crack a nut?81 Moreover, it is strange
that precisely the only part of this threefold law that
does seek to directly change the TBS system – i.e. the
earlier mentioned second part of the draft law, aiming to
alter the maximised conditional termination of the TBS
order in an indeterminate duration – is at odds with the
equally introduced supervisory safety measure. It is
redundant to abolish the maximum term of conditional
TBS termination, making the supervision possibly life-
long, while at the same time introducing a separate safe-
ty measure that also allows for life-long supervision after
termination of the TBS order. Surely at least the evalua-
tion of this already drastic change in the TBS scheme
should be awaited before a new measure is added to the
sanction system. The ISD measure for repeat offenders
shows that it is necessary to await such an evaluation of
existing measures instead of hastily introducing a new
measure.82
This criticism with regard to the new supervisory safety
measure based on the LRM test also holds true when
one recalls the first part of the law – the possibility to
continuously extend the probationary period associated
with the conditional release from imprisonment, making
it possibly life-long. Therefore, also in terms of a prison
sentence, indeterminate supervision of dangerous
offenders will be possible, which again undermines the
legislator’s argument of disturbing supervision ‘gaps’. In
fact, when one looks at the Dutch sentencing scheme as
a whole, it appears that in the past decades there has
been truly a rise of (preventive) supervision
modalities.83 By introducing new and strengthening
existing both front door and back door supervision
modalities, the Government aims to achieve a more
effective criminal justice system.84 But even outside the
criminal justice system, if for some reason the penal
foundation for a legitimised supervision ends, there are
opportunities from other legal jurisdictions to protect
society or to enhance a good rehabilitation of the offend-
80. Largely following Van der Wolf and Struijk, above n. 53.
81. E. Brems and L. Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a
Nut”: Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights’, 15 Human Rights Law Review 139 (2015).
82. Struijk (2011), above n. 3.
83. Van der Wolf and Struijk, above n. 53 and Bleichrodt et al., above
n. 60.
84. Bleichrodt et al., above n. 60.
er. For instance, in the presence of a disorder from
which danger arises, the possibility exists to place some-
one into a psychiatric hospital. If the present draft law
on Forensic Care is adopted, this possibility will belong
to the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that it can
better meet the end of a penal sentence. Together with
another draft law on Mandatory Mental Health, this
possibility will also allow for mandatory medication or
supervision modalities.85 Finally, the law allows for
mayors to ask in civil proceedings for imposing supervi-
sory conditions on supposedly still dangerous ex-
offenders who return in the mayor’s community.86
5 Evaluation from a Human
Rights Perspective
Given the sharp increase of supervision in many West-
ern jurisdictions, the stringent character and the (possi-
bly life-)long-term nature thereof, and the attendant
questions of human rights considerations, one would
expect a clear human rights framework. But already on
the Dutch national level, there is no legal or constitu-
tional framework to test these kinds of penal develop-
ments because the Constitution (Art. 120) forbids judg-
es to declare a law in breach of the constitution. Never-
theless, considering the fact that according to the same
Constitution (Art. 94) international (human rights) law
– more precisely, binding treaty provisions and resolu-
tions by international organisations – takes precedence
over national law, one would expect an international
catalogue of criteria. Yet, the opposite is true. Unlike
the penal concept of (preventive) detention, for which
the directly applicable and legally binding framework of
Articles 3 and 5 ECHR applies to assess whether the
detention is legitimate and whether its execution is
humane, such a framework is lacking with regard to the
penal concept of (preventive) supervision. As set forth
in the editorial of this special issue, there is no clear,
uniform legal framework to assess whether supervision
is a legitimate punishment as such, but rather a hetero-
geneous framework. Based on the description of this
legal framework of the Council of Europe in the editori-
al, we will evaluate next whether the currently enacted
Dutch law – more specifically the new supervisory safe-
ty measure – is legitimate or that it may form a breach of
a certain (human) right.
With respect to the non-legally binding recommenda-
tions within the framework of the Council of Europe,
and relevant to the present Dutch draft law, the current
European Rules on Community Sanctions and Meas-
ures (Rec(2000)22) merely states that a community
85. J. Legemaate et al., Thematische wetsevaluatie gedwongen zorg
(2014).
86. C.E. Huls and J.G. Brouwer, De terugkeer van zedendelinquenten in de
wijk (2013). However, this is not allowed during a conditional release
(Court Midden-Nederland 6 November 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:
2013:5494) or if the conditions are too severe (Court of Appeal Den
Bosch 5 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:BZ3488).
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sanction or measure ordinarily shall not be of indetermi-
nate duration.87 This provides some grounds and flexi-
bility for the justification of both the supervisory safety
measure and the two other parts of the Dutch law, all of
which supervisory modalities may indeed be of infinite
length. However, in principle, the duration of the
modality is actually determined in advance by the judge,
after which it can be renewed infinitely. In this respect,
it is also important that not only the aforementioned
recommendation but also other applicable recommenda-
tions, such as the recently adopted recommendation
with regard to electronic monitoring (Rec(2014)4), call
for proportionality, defining this principle as propor-
tionate to the seriousness of the committed offence, not
the alleged offenders’ risk and danger.
The proportionality requirement for introducing and
implementing a national modality of supervision also
derives from Article 2 Fourth Protocol ECHR,88 a sec-
ond ‘entrance’ for assessing the new supervisory safety
measure. The implication of this requirement that an
interference must be necessary, i.e. that it corresponds
to a pressing social need and is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued, is also true for assessing the
extent to which a supervisory modality infringe on the
offenders’ right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence under Article 8
ECHR. This assessment is certainly relevant to the vari-
ous supervision conditions permitted under the Dutch
draft law, which inevitably involve a fundamental
restriction of one’s freedom of movement and privacy.
This certainly applies for the restrictive conditions men-
tioned in the previous sections such as restraining
orders concerning certain areas or to have contact with
certain people, a ban to do certain voluntary work, a ban
to live in certain areas and the opposite duty to move
from a certain area. In the pre-legislative justification of
the proposed supervisory safety measure, the Dutch
Government justifies explicitly that, and why, these
conditions, as well as the proposed measure as such,
may very well satisfy the aforementioned necessity
requirement.89 Yet, to our opinion, the adduced justifi-
cation that the new possibility of restrictive conditions
for a (life-)long period will provide additional customi-
sation possibilities for achieving a controlled and gradu-
al rehabilitation of certain dangerous offenders is not
convincing enough, especially because in recent years
this argument is already used very often to extend the
range of conditional supervisory modalities.90 It does
stop at some point. Especially considering the fact that
in practice little need seems to exist for the introduction
of such a severe (life-)long supervisory safety measure,
as discussed in Section 3. Not only do the impact analy-
sis and expected success rate concerning the supervisory
87. C. Morgenstern, ‘European Initiatives for Harmonization and Minimum
Standards in the Field of Community Sanctions and Measures’, 1 Euro-
pean Journal of Probation 128 (2009).
88. Again, for an elaborated description of this legal framework, see the
editorial of this issue.
89. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 816, n. 3.
90. Struijk (2014), above n. 57.
safety measure show rather low numbers, but moreover,
and perhaps even more important, not all executive
authorities are keen on actually implementing this meas-
ure. This specifically holds true for the judiciary. In the
Netherlands, the judiciary is inclined to exert strict con-
trol over the proportionality in the imposition and exe-
cution of sanctions, not only by the criminal court,91 but
by the civil court in summary proceedings as well. In a
recent example of such proceedings, the civil court
explicitly ruled that two of the restrictive conditions
imposed on a conditionally released offender – an area
restraining order with associated electronic monitoring
for five municipalities – were disproportionate and
therefore needed to be suspended.92
To sum up, the legal notions of proportionality and
LRM certainly do provide an entrance for both national
courts and the ECtHR, to decide whether the applica-
tion of certain restrictive conditions in individual cases
is acceptable. Nevertheless, as mentioned, Dutch devel-
opments do not differ from the general ‘line’ in penal
legislation and sentencing policy in many other Europe-
an Countries. This makes it more difficult for the Stras-
bourg Court because it can hardly condemn a jurisdic-
tion that is ‘beyond the average’. Moreover, as the Court
seems to be in favour of reducing long-term imprison-
ment, it is provisionally not to be expected that it will
adopt a critical approach towards supervision as an
alternative form of punishment.
By discussing the execution of the (restrictive) condi-
tions that can potentially be imposed in the context of
supervision, we come to the third ‘entrance’ for assessing
the supervisory safety measure from a human rights
perspective. This relates to the complex legal possibility
that supervision is that restrictive and far-reaching, giv-
en the degree and intensity of the conditions imposed on
the offender, that it does not apply so much to the test
of Article 2 Fourth Protocol but rather to the more
stringent test of Article 5 ECHR. This possibility stems
from case law of the ECtHR,93 applied by the courts in
the Netherlands.94 However, it is difficult to predict in
advance when supervision in a certain case may fall
within the scope of Article 5 ECHR. One might expect
that a notification order, to report to the Probation
Services, may as such not fall within this scope, in con-
trast perhaps to (combinations of) more restrictive con-
ditions such as life-long restraining orders. With regard
to the new safety measure, this may very well be the
case. As mentioned in Section 3, there are some possi-
bilities where this supervisory measure could turn into
the deprivation of the offenders’ liberty, e.g. because of a
condition to participate in treatment with clinical admis-
sion, or because of the legal effect of alternative deten-
91. See e.g. Dutch Supreme Court 27 March 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:
2012:BV6996, with regard to the conditional supervisory TBS measure.
92. Court of Appeal Den Haag 30 July 2014, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:9411.
93. See e.g. ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, Applic. No. 7367/76, 6 November
1980; see further Bleichrodt et al., above n. 60.
94. See e.g. Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden 9 January 2014,
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:67 and Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden 20
February 2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:1669.
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tion for a maximum duration of six months whenever a
condition is breached. Surely those conditions have to
meet the requirements of Article 5 ECHR. Consequent-
ly, it may be possible that, in a certain case, the com-
plete set of imposed conditions is so restrictive that what
seems to be (only) restriction of liberty in practice
amounts to deprivation of liberty.
Knowing the legal difficulties and the importance of this
assessment with regard to Article 5 ECHR, the Govern-
ment has given quite some attention to it in their pre-
legislative justification. This was obviously prompted by
recent case law of the ECtHR concerning the German
safety measure ‘nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung’, a
modality of preventive detention, which to the opinion
of the Court constituted a violation of Articles 5 and 7
ECHR.95 The main problem concerning this preventive
detention measure was twofold. First, the lack of a caus-
al link between the preventive detention and a specific
offence, required by Article 5(1)a, and second, the fact
that this measure was not based on a conviction within
the meaning of that provision, required by Article 5(1)c.
To our knowledge, when the Dutch safety measure
enters into force, it would not constitute a violation of
the convention on these restriction grounds. First, the
aforementioned possibility of alternative detention
whenever a condition is breached is likely to involve
lawful detention under Article 5(1)a because that deten-
tion is directly linked to a conviction by a competent
court. The same might be true for the second, and
equally aforementioned, possibility of mandatory partic-
ipation in treatment with clinical admission. Yet, this
possibility does have to meet the additional require-
ments stated by the ECtHR in order to be the ‘lawful
detention of a person of unsound mind’ within the
meaning of Article 5(1)e.96
In our opinion, the proposed measure could generally
withstand the test of Article 5 ECHR. First, because of
the twofold sentencing procedure the Government pro-
poses – the execution does not involve additional pun-
ishment – and the fact that both the decision to impose
the supervisory safety measure and the decision to
actually execute the imposed measure are made by an
independent court, while both decisions can be
reviewed in appeal. That in itself is a strong legal safe-
guard, besides various other safeguards such as the pro-
cedure in which the offender may ask the court to
change or terminate the conditions imposed upon him,
as well as the extension procedure that automatically
involves a periodic judicial review of the necessity of
(further extending) the measure.97 Yet, regarding the
95. ECtHR, M. v. Germany, Applic. No. 19359/04, 17 December 2009 and
ECtHR, Jendrowiak v. Germany, Applic. No. 30060/04, 14 April 2011;
see further J. Kinzig, ‘The ECHR and the German System of Preventive
Detention: an Overview of the Current Legal Situation in Germany’, in
M. Caianiello and M.L. Corrado (eds.), Preventing Danger: New Para-
digms in Criminal Justice (2013), 71, as well as the contribution of Mei-
er in this special issue.
96. See e.g. ECtHR, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, Applic. No. 6301/73,
24 October 1979.
97. Such as required in ECtHR, X v. UK, Applic. No. 7215/75, 5 November
1981.
new measure as a whole we do have serious doubts con-
cerning the requirements of proportionality and necessi-
ty, as elaborated on before. Both the questions whether
the measure will meet these requirements and whether
the conditions that would actually be imposed on the
offender would be that stringent and grave that they
could not meet the (other) requirements of Article 5
ECHR, are to be answered by the judiciary. Moreover,
another bottleneck might be the fact that as a result of
the twofold sentencing procedure – whereby the deci-
sion making on the imposition and the execution of the
measure is separated in time, which could easily amount
to over ten years because the equally imposed prison
sentence or TBS safety measure has to be fully executed
first – the offender cannot foresee at the time of his con-
viction whether the imposed supervisory safety measure
will actually be executed or not, nor can he foresee the
specific content of the measure or by which behaviour
he may influence the extension decision. Moreover, in
so far as this latter unforeseeability relates to a proper
treatment, the offender is highly dependent on the Gov-
ernment. Therefore, although we would not argue that
Article 5 ECHR is seriously at stake, once the law is
implemented it may be assessed by the (national) courts
as an infringement of the requirement of foreseeability
as derived from Article 7 ECHR.
The fourth and in our view perhaps most important or at
least most fundamental ‘entrance’ for human rights
assessment might be found in another direction., Article
10(3) ICCPR – a binding provision in the Netherlands –
calls for a prison system that provides in treatment of
detainees, which is primarily aimed at ‘reformation and
social rehabilitation’. Reading this provision as part of
the guarantee for humanity in para. 1, one might argue
that, with this provision, a right to reformation and
social rehabilitation is guaranteed as a human right,98
which includes a much more profound and broader con-
cept than the Dutch reducing reoffending concept of
rehabilitation.99 At least, it contains a strong urge for
member states to aim for a true rehabilitation and a full
return to society. This concept calls upon member states
to accept this aim as a positive obligation for their sanc-
tion system including the execution of custodial sanc-
tions. Moreover, the ECtHR has stated that a true,
social rehabilitation is a mandatory factor in penal poli-
cy.100 However, as disappointing as it might be, in the
same case law, the Court has added that ‘the Convention
does not guarantee, as such, a right to rehabilitation’.
Yet, within the framework of the Council of Europe,
98. J. de Lange and P.A.M. Mevis, ‘De beoordeling van de menswaardig-
heid van detentiesituaties’, Sancties 157 (2003).
99. Struijk (2011), above n. 3; Struijk (2015), above n. 20; M.M. Boone,
‘Judicial Rehabilitation in the Netherlands: Balancing between Safety
and Privacy’, 3 European Journal of Probation 63 (2011) and S. Meijer,
‘De opmars en evolutie van het resocialisatiebegrip’, 9 Delikt en Delin-
kwent 688 (2015).
100. See e.g. ECtHR Khoroshenko v. Russia, Applic. No. 41418/04, 30 June
2015, para. 121; ECtHR Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, Applic.
No. 15018/11 and 61199/12, 8 July 2014, paras. 243-6, and ECtHR
Vinter v. UK, Applic. No. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013,
paras. 111-6. See e.g. Meijer (2015), above n. 99.
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soft rules do incite a right to rehabilitation, e.g. Article 6
European Prison Rules. Moreover, in many cases con-
cerning (life-)long imprisonment, the ECtHR stresses
the prospect of rehabilitation as an important legal aim
and principle.101 In this approach of the Court, one can
clearly read a dedication if not an obligation towards a
long series of efforts for an offender’s full return into
society. In our view, this approach does not only relate
to imprisonment as such but moreover and mainly to
the ‘in between’ period of conditional release as well.
How does this relate to the Dutch law striving for inde-
terminate supervision? Our first objection is that, if the
new supervision modalities are to be characterised first
and foremost as a mechanism aiming to control the
offenders’ conduct, this aim is by far not enough to
regard these modalities as part of social rehabilitation in
its true form. The second objection is that these super-
vision modalities, especially those of (life-)long dura-
tion, effectively hamper social rehabilitation. As we
already argued in Sections 3 and 4, research shows that
even if there might be an argument for supervision
beyond the currently possible duration, the mere
emphasis on control is not effective and thus not legiti-
mate.
Concerning the specific content of the Dutch law, the
same applies for the modality of supervision after a pris-
on sentence. In this respect, the justification by the
Government is that even if the imposed sanction is
legally ending, the aim of preventing recidivism may
imply that the offender’s return to society is not permit-
ted without ongoing control. This justification is highly
debatable though, because if an unconditional return to
society is not accepted as a possibility, in the end the
execution of imprisonment as such is disputed. More-
over, one might seriously wonder whether in this line of
reasoning such a control-oriented supervision can be
legitimised in terms of social rehabilitation. One could
even raise the question as to what extent these supervi-
sion modalities actually lean on a conviction for a crimi-
nal offence. Finally, because such a control-oriented
system persists in excluding offenders, it is a wilful cre-
ated handicap for true ‘anthroposophic’ rehabilitation of
the offender ‘into one of us’. Consequently, in our view
such a supervision system may very well come up for
discussion with the ECtHR.
The same objections and concerns are true with regard
to the new independent supervisory safety measure.
Although the judge would impose this sanction together
with a conviction for the offence, ensuring a clear and
causal link between the supervision and a specific
offense, its execution will take place in an unforeseen
time after the execution of an equally imposed prison
sentence or TBS measure. Thus, it can be unmasked as
another modality aiming for ongoing control after the
execution of an initial punishment as proportionate
reaction to the offence. The fact that the supervisory
safety measure is applied simultaneously with the pun-
ishment is a mere pretext to avoid a breach of Article 5
101. See e.g. ECtHR Vinter v. UK and ECtHR Khoroshenko v. Russia.
ECHR, influenced by the German case law regarding
the preventive detention modality of ‘nachträgliche
Sicherungsverwahrung’. This procedural provision can
and may not hide the true character of the new Dutch
measure: the perilous non-acceptance of an offender’s
unconditional return into society.
In this respect, only the last part of the law – preventive
supervision after a TBS measure – might be criticised
less, yet only because and in so far this TBS measure is
aimed at treatment and influencing the offender’s
behaviour instead of control. If the offender’s restriction
of liberty instead of his deprivation of liberty is thought
to be sufficient to meet this aim as well as to reduce his
risk, then this new post-custodial supervision modality
more or less entails a variation of the already existing
concept of the conditional TBS measure. But again only
if the execution and the treatment are based on the pros-
pect of true rehabilitation instead of mere control.
6 Conclusion
Central to this article is the currently enacted law on
post-custodial release supervision in the Netherlands,
focusing on a threefold increase in the post-custodial
supervision of dangerous (sex) offenders. All three parts
of the law could result in life-long supervision of these
offenders. The first two parts do so by extending the
possibilities of supervision as part of the conditional
release after the execution of either a prison sentence or
a TBS safety measure. The third part, though, introdu-
ces an independent supervisory safety measure, which is
to be executed after either a prison sentence or a TBS
measure is conditionally or unconditionally ended.
Because of the profound change that such a new inde-
pendent safety measure will trigger the Dutch penal
sanction system, we have particularly analysed and
assessed the latter part, both in relation to the Dutch
sentencing theory and the existing sanctions in the
Dutch penal law system, as to the legal criteria resulting
from a human rights framework such as proportionality
and LRM. Resulting from that analysis, we come to the
main conclusion that the new independent supervisory
safety measure is not legitimate (yet). The main argu-
ment is not so much a clear violation of the human
rights framework – although the imposed conditions
may be that restrictive and severe that they could
amount to a violation under Article 5(4) ECHR, and the
actual content of the measure may furthermore be so
unforeseeable that it could amount to an infringement of
Article 7 ECHR – but rather the fact that the need for
this measure is still unclear.
This has much to do with the current lack of (empirical
evidence of) the necessity of this possibly life-long
supervisory measure, the lack of legitimising supervi-
sion ‘gaps’ in the existing penal sanction system, the fact
that the other parts of the discussed law equally result in
a possibility of life-long supervision of the same offend-
er category, the lack of any individual interest that could
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legitimise the imposition and execution of this preven-
tive safety measure, the much broader European penal
concept of ‘social rehabilitation’ to which the Dutch
concept should comply but currently fails to do so, and
finally, the lack of clear criteria in the legal framework
for both determining the initial dangerousness of the
offender and deciding whether the supervisory measure
needs to be extended and how the offender could influ-
ence this decision. All in all, it is premature to adopt
such a drastic penal law while the need and legitimacy
have not yet been demonstrated. The call for this possi-
bly life-long supervisory safety measure seems mainly
aimed at defusing the public controversy and preventing
an (alleged) dangerous (ex-)offender from recidivism,
than actually investing in a true and social rehabilitation
of this offender.
Nevertheless, as said, the draft law has indeed been
enacted by Dutch Parliament recently and is expected to
take effect in the summer of 2016. It is highly likely that
the fact that new tragic events continue to occur with
(conditionally) released offenders committing violent
crimes not only strengthened the call from politics and
society to increase the legal possibilities for life-long
supervision, but also played an important part in the
Democratic voting. Without any judicial legitimacy, the
widely held motto seems to be ‘better safe than sorry’.
In our view, this is by no means enough to justify such a
severe penal sanction. Moreover, when this law will take
effect, we have strong concerns that – triggered by a
culture of fear and public security – pressure will be
exercised upon Dutch judiciary to impose and execute
the supervisory safety measure upon offenders rather
for normative than scientific reasons. One can only hope
that judiciary will once again demonstrate their inde-
pendent and critical judgement by weighing both the
public interests and the individual’s interests. Only such
a judgement, especially concerning both the execution
and the extension of this supervisory measure, could
prevent a counterproductive effect of the measure
whereby the (ex-)offender grows so socially isolated that
he becomes (only more) dangerous. To ‘support’ Dutch
judiciary in this, it is necessary that the ECtHR will
develop the concept of social rehabilitation further, in
order to be an effective legal safeguard against – at
least – an overuse of the new supervision modalities.
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